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THE $62 MILLION QUESTION: IS VIRGINIA'S NEW
CENTER TO HOUSE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
MONEY WELL SPENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2008, Virginia opened a state-of-the-art, $62
million facility to house some of the Commonwealth's most re-
viled criminals.1 The Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilita-
tion, formerly located in Petersburg, houses about sixty sexual
predators, all of whom were expected to move into the new facility
in the week following its formal opening.2
Among the sixty-one sexual predators lodged in Virginia is Au-
brey Layne, a forty-year-old Norfolk resident who, at fourteen,
was hospitalized for molesting a four-year-old girl.3 In his twen-
ties, Layne was found guilty of two sexual offenses against chil-
dren under the age of ten: fondling and forcible sodomy.4 In his
thirties, Layne again victimized a child, this time an eleven-year-
old Norfolk boy, and was convicted of taking indecent liberties
with the child.'
Thomas Lambert, a fifty-two-year-old Norfolk native, will also
make the move with Aubrey Layne.' Lambert has a similarly ex-
tensive list of sexual offenses-at seven years of age, Lambert
1. Frank Green, Center for Sex Offenders Opens, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 27,
2008, at B2, available at 2008 WLNR 4090120 [hereinafter Green, Center for Sex Offend-
ers Opens]; see also Press Release, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, Virginia Center for Behavioral
Rehabilitation to Hold Ribbon Cutting, Open House for New Facility (Feb. 22, 2008),
available at http://www.dmhmrsas.virginia.gov/PressReleases/content/080221VCBROpen
ing.pdf.
2. Green, Center for Sex Offenders Opens, supra note 1.
3. Warren Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law: Too Dangerous to Be Released?,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 11, 2007, at Al, available at http://hamptonroads.com/print/423911
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was committed to a state hospital for pulling down a girl's pants;
as a teenager, he forced four girls to strip at knifepoint; in his
twenties, he was convicted of the rapes of two Norfolk women;
and in his thirties, he was convicted of the molestation of a Rich-
mond woman.7
No one contends that Aubrey Layne or Thomas Lambert is
anything other than a chronic sexual predator.' But Virginia's so-
lution for dealing with recidivistic offenders such as Layne or
Lambert is lacking: the Commonwealth's hefty investment in the
new facility in Nottoway County to house these predators is mis-
guided spending.
This comment examines Virginia's current civil commitment
statute for sexual predators and attempts to identify areas where
Virginia should concentrate its limited resources in order to ad-
dress more adequately the ever-increasing problem of what to do
with sex offenders. Part II briefly describes why sex offenders
present law enforcement with unique problems in prevention and
deterrence. Part III details the history of civil commitment legis-
lation. Part IV examines Supreme Court of the United States ju-
risprudence regarding the constitutionality of sex offender civil
commitment statutes. Part V examines the Virginia Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act. Part VI briefly considers current violent sexual
predator legislation in other states, using Washington and Texas
as examples. Part VII provides analysis and criticism of the cur-
rent Virginia statute. Part VIII recommends ways in which Vir-
ginia might reform the current law. Part IX concludes the com-
ment.
II. SEX OFFENDERS
American society pillories the sex offender.9 Sex offenders pose
a unique public policy problem. They incite public fear and hatred
unlike any other group of offenders, yet the absence of a clear sex
offender "profile" creates much difficulty for law enforcement offi-
cials in preventing and deterring these crimes. 10 Current rules
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 76 (1999).
10. See id. at 81.
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applying to incarceration and treatment of sex offenders reveal a
common theme: "[T]here is a 'special depravity' associated with
sexually related crimes, to the extent that sex offenders are per-
ceived as 'especially vile and loathsome people who really do not
deserve to be treated like defendants in other crimes.""'1
In the face of a "pressing political and public safety imperative"
to deal with recidivist sex offenders, many states have developed
sexually violent predator ("SVP") laws. 2 SVP laws "incapacitat[e]
patently dangerous sex offenders beyond the legally mandated
end of their criminal sentence."' 3 Some experts believe that with
behavioral treatment and medication, it is possible to minimize or
eliminate sex offender behaviors. 4 Other experts believe, how-
ever, that long term treatment for this population does not exist,
and, therefore, the only effective method of deterrence and pre-
vention is complete removal of sex offenders from the commu-
nity. 1
5
III. HISTORY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT LEGISLATION
Society's treatment of hot-button social issues evokes for many
scholars "the pendulum effect":' 6 the law surrounding a particu-
lar issue is prone to fluctuations in which the law of previous
generations once again becomes popular and is adopted as "re-
formist jurisprudence." 7 The law surrounding the traditional
civil commitment of the mentally ill, and the civil commitment of
sexual offenders, aptly demonstrates such a pendulum swing.
11. Id. (quoting Richard I. Lanyon, Scientific Status of the Concept of Continuing
Emotional Propensity for Sexually Aberrant Acts, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 59, 60
(1997)).
12. Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on
Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 357-58 (2006).
13. Id. at 358
14. Friedland, supra note 9, at 82.
15. Id.
16. Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums:
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A. Traditional Civil Commitment
Civil commitment became a legal tool in 1880.18 Then, common
law allowed for the lawful restraint of a person "incapable of con-
trolling his own actions, whose being at large endangers the
safety of others."' 9 Any person whose mental condition threat-
ened public safety was subject to civil commitment.2°
The theories of police power and parens patriae undergird sup-
port for traditional civil commitment of the mentally disabled.2
The theory of police power proclaims a state's duty to protect its
citizens from dangerous persons, and the theory of parens patriae
asserts the state's parental role to care for those incapable of car-
ing for themselves.22 Courts commonly rely on both theories to
justify a decision to impose civil commitment.23
In the 1840s, under these theories of police power and parens
patriae, the first institutions to commit people with mental dis-
abilities began operating.2 4 Proponents of the institutions hoped
to cure insanity; however, by the 1860s it became apparent that
many committed persons were incurable, and the attempted
treatments unsuccessful.25 Commitment thus fell out of favor un-
til the end of the 19th century, when the eugenics movement as-
cended in popularity. 26 As a result of the eugenics movement,
many mentally disabled people were committed. 27 The eugenics
movement hit the downswing of its popularity in the 1930s and
18. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, SEX OFFENDER TASK FORCE REPORT 58 (2005), avail-
able at http://vscc.state.va.us/reports/sex offender TaskForce Report.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's
Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and
Prevention, 9 J.L. & POLY 879, 887 (2001).
22. Id.; see also Ronnie Hall, In the Shadowlands: Fisher and the Outpatient Civil
Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators" in Texas, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 175,
177-78 (2006).
23. Hall, supra note 22, at 178; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 96
(1992) (noting both police power and the theory ofparens patriae as justifications for civil
commitment).
24. Spierling, supra note 21, at 887.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 18 (1996) ("The eugenicists' solution called for the use of invol-
untary commitment laws to enforce the strict segregation of mentally retarded people from
society at large, in order to prevent them from propogating. . .
27. Spierling, supra note 21, at 887-88.
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1940s, however, and once again civil commitment was no longer
in vogue.2"
The judiciary found little occasion to apply involuntary com-
mitment procedures until the early 1970s,29 when, in 1975, the
Supreme Court of the United States clarified the limits of civil
commitment.3 ° Although a factor in the court's decision, a simple
finding of mental illness cannot justify custodial confinement.3' If
the state also proves dangerousness, however, commitment is ap-
propriate.32
B. Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders
Involuntary confinement of sex offenders mimics the pendulum
swing of traditional civil commitment for the mentally disabled.
Prior to the late 1930s, sex offenders were unremarkable as
criminals.33 People who committed crimes of a sexual nature were
dealt with like all other offenders; blame and punishment were
assigned via criminal conviction and incarceration.34
In the 1930s, however, a series of brutal child murders that
appeared to have sexual motivations prompted FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover to declare the "'degeneracy' of sex crimes . . . 'be
placed under the spotlight.' 35 Under pressure from citizens, state
legislators sought to pass laws addressing the "perceived wave of
sex crimes. '"36 Legislation was designed to confine "'sexual psy-
chopaths,' 'sexually dangerous persons,' and 'sex offenders"'37 af-
ter their incarceration, while such offenders were believed to be
too dangerous for release. 3' These laws were based on the ration-
28. Id. at 888.
29. Id.
30. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
31. Id. at 575.
32. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
33. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 70.
34. Id.
35. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 53
(1998) (quoting J. Edgar Hoover, How Safe is Your Daughter, AM. MAG., 1947, at 32)
36. Hall, supra note 22, at 180; see also Raquel Blacher, Note, Historical Perspective of
the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime
Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897-901 (1995) (discussing the catalysts for "sex psychopath"
laws).
37. John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of
Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996).
38. See id. at 1297. "The sexual psychopath was depicted as someone neither criminal
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ale that society would benefit and the state could protect the pub-
lic's safety if dangerous sex offenders were liberated only when
cured. 39
Michigan was the first to enact a "sex psychopath" statute in
1937.40 By 1939, three other states had passed similarly targeted
laws.4 ' By 1960, the majority of states had sexual predator legis-
lation designed to remove the offender from the community and
treat the underlying mental condition. 42 The sexual psychopath
laws so popular during this time period were rarely implemented,
however,43 and by the 1980s, as a result of civil rights concerns
and the apparent failure to establish successful sex offender
treatment programs, the number of states with sexual predator
legislation had been cut in half.44
In the 1990s, states revisited and reinstated modern versions of
these sex psychopath laws.45 The renewed interest in such stat-
utes resulted in large part from the highly publicized case of Earl
Shriner, who, in 1989, raped, choked, mutilated, and left for dead
a seven-year-old boy. 46 Although Shriner had an extensive prior
nor legally insane who, for the individual's and society's best interests, required special
considerations." Lieb et al., supra note 35, at 55.
39. Lieb et al., supra note 35, at 56.
40. Blacher, supra note 36, at 897. Michigan's statute was later found unconstitu-
tional. See People v. Frontczak, 281 N.W. 534, 535-37 (Mich. 1938) (finding Act No. 196,
Public Acts 1937, unconstitutional as enacted).
41. Lieb et al., supra note 35, at 55 (pointing out that Illinois passed its law in 1938
and California and Minnesota passed such statutes in 1939); see also CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5500-09 (1939) (current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West Supp.
2008)); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/0.01-12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 526.09-526.115 (1939) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.02, 253B.185
(West 2006)).
42. Cornwell, supra note 37, at 1297; John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of
Conducting Risk Assessments for Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent
Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 88, 89 (2005). State statutes varied. Some re-
quired a finding of criminal guilt before civil commitment, whereas some did not, and
states used varied terms to describe the mental condition required of the offender.
Cornwell, supra note 37, at 1296-97 (citing Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A
Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 529 (1965-66)).
All statutes, though, required that the offender suffer from a personality disorder that
caused him to act out sexually in ways that violated both the law and social norms. Id. at
1297 (citing Note, supra). Most statutes permitted involuntary detention until the commit-
ted sex offender no longer created a threat to society. Id. at 1297 (citing Alan H. Swanson,
Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 215, 218 (1960-61)).
43. Fabian, supra note 42, at 89.
44. Cornwell, supra note 37, at 1297.
45. Id. at 1298.
46. Marc W. Pearce, Civilly Committing Criminals: An Analysis of the Expressive
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criminal history that included sexual offenses,47 the State of
Washington had been unsuccessful in petitioning for his civil
commitment under the existing law.4" It was only two years after
his release from prison that Shriner brutally attacked the seven-
year-old boy. "
Washington quickly enacted legislation targeting sexually vio-
lent predators like Shriner-offenders "who belong to a 'small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators' who are
not amenable to commitment under the state's standard proce-
dure."5" The legislation was designed to keep them confined even
after their prison sentences ended. 1 The State found new legisla-
tion necessary for two reasons: first, the existing involuntary
treatment act did not reach the types of mental disorders appar-
ently afflicting sexually violent predators; and second, sexual of-
fenders serving prison terms were denied access to potential vic-
tims, and therefore could not have committed a "recent overt act"
as required under the standard civil commitment statute, frus-
trating the state's ability to seek civil commitment.52 Washing-
ton's SVP statute, therefore, was intended to close this perceived
Function of Nebraska's "Dangerous Sex Offender" Commitment Procedure, 85 NEB. L. REV.
575, 580 (2007) (citing David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525, 525-38 (1992); Kate Shatzkin, Shriner Guilty: Jury Convicts
Him in Attack on Boy, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at Al; System Fails to Halt Sex Of-
fender, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 24, 1989, at A6).
47. In 1977, Shriner was convicted of assaults on two sixteen-year-old girls and sen-
tenced to ten years in prison. Pearce, supra note 46, at 580. Just before his release in
1987, Shriner's diaries and drawings depicting his "intent to rape, torture, and kill chil-
dren" were discovered. Id. (quoting David Foster, Many Favor Tougher Policy on Sex Of-
fenders: Mutilation Case Fuels Outrage, Questions About Rehabilitation, AKRON BEACON
J., Feb. 18, 1990, at All, available at www.ohio.com/archives (select "Beacon Journal";
search for "Many Favor Tougher Policy on Sex Offenders"). Indications of Shriner's intent




50. Id. at 581-82 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002) (emphasis
in original omitted)).
51. See Community Protection Act, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 12, 91. The Community
Protection Act was the "first revised sexual predator law passed in the United States." Fa-
bian, supra note 42, at 89. The Act increased the length of sentences for sex offenders, im-
plemented the nation's first modern community notification law targeting sex offenders,
and established a new civil commitment procedure for certain sex offenders. See 1990
Wash. Sess. Laws 96-97.
52. Pearce, supra note 46, at 582 (discussing the Washington statute).
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gap in the traditional civil commitment act to allow for the com-
mitment of sexually violent predators.53
Other states quickly followed Washington's lead and enacted
their own SVP acts. Between 1994 and 1995, Wisconsin, Kansas,
Iowa, Minnesota, California, and Arizona implemented SVP stat-
utes.5 4 Today, twenty states have statutes allowing for the civil
commitment of sex offenders. 2
IV. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The enactment of numerous state statutes permitting the civil
commitment of sex offenders-after such offenders have served
their time in prison-has drawn sharp criticism. Opponents of
such laws argue that it is a violation of both the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to civilly commit such persons.56
The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the constitutionality of
SVP acts.
53. Id. at 582-83.
54. Cornwell, supra note 37, at 1299.
55. See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders
After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, § 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.coml
2007/03/04/us/04civil.html [hereinafter Davey & Goodnough, Doubts Rise] (profiling nine-
teen states with civil commitment acts for sex offenders). At the time Davey & Good-
nough's article was written, New York was considering sex offender civil commitment leg-
islation. Currently, twenty states, including New York, provide for civil commitment of sex
offenders. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3707 to -3717 (2003 & Supp. 2007); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 6604 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-932 (West 2006 &
Supp. 2008); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/0.01-/12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1-16 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a07 to -29a21 (2005 &
Supp. 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1-16 (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
253B.02-.23 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480-513 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 71-1201 to -1226 (Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1 to :23 (Supp. 2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-07
(Consol. Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -24 (2002 & Supp. 2007); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6401-6409 (West Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-20 to -170
(2002 & Supp. 2007); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001-.150 (Vernon 2003 &
Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -920 (2005 & Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 71.09.010-902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-.14 (West
2007).
56. See Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3; Charles Oliver, Sex Crime
and Punsihment [sic], REASON, Mar. 1993, http://www.reason.com/news/show/29351.html
(discussing the potential effects of civil commitment laws).
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A. Kansas v. Hendricks
The first major constitutional challenge to the civil commit-
ment of sexually violent predators came in Kansas v. Hendricks.57
In 1994, the Kansas legislature enacted its SVP Act ("the Act") to
address the problem of repeat sexual offenders.5" The Act pro-
vided for the civil commitment of persons with mental abnormali-
ties or personality disorders who were likely to commit 'preda-
tory acts of sexual violence."'' 9
Hendricks had been previously convicted of numerous sexual
offenses against children and was diagnosed as a pedophile.6" He
challenged the trial court's finding that pedophilia met the re-
quirement of a "mental abnormality" so as to make him eligible
for civil commitment.61 Hendricks argued that his liberty inter-
ests were violated because a mental abnormality did not equate
to a conclusion that he was "'mentally ill."'62 The Kansas Supreme
Court agreed, finding that substantive due process required clear
and convincing evidence that the person was mentally ill and a
danger to himself or others. 63
The Supreme Court of the United States found that the Act's
definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied substantive due proc-
ess, and stated that involuntary civil commitment is permissible
for those who, because they lack the ability to control their behav-
ior, threaten public safety.64 The Court noted that "[a] finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment";
but, "proof of dangerousness . . . [and] some additional factor,
such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality' . . . serve[s] to
limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a vo-
litional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their con-
trol."65
57. 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
58. Id. at 350.
59. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1994)).
60. Id. at 354.
61. Id. at 355-56.
62. Pearce, supra note 46, at 596 (quoting In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan.
1996)).
63. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
64. Id. at 356-57.
65. Id. at 358.
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The Court also rejected Hendricks' claims that the Act violated
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United
States Constitution.66 In addition to recognizing the Kansas legis-
lature's intent to create a civil statute,67 the Court determined
that the statute did not purport to promote the concepts of retri-
bution and deterrence, which are the twin aims of criminal pun-
ishment.68 Consequently, lacking a penal facet, the Act did not
violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.69 There-
fore, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's decision
and declared Kansas's SVP statute constitutional.7 °
B. Kansas v. Crane
In a second case from Kansas, Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme
Court of the United States again considered the constitutionality
of Kansas's SVP Act. 71 In Crane, Kansas sought to civilly commit
a convicted sexual offender who suffered from exhibitionism and
antisocial personality disorder.72 The trial court ordered Crane's
civil commitment, but the Kansas Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the Supreme Court's ruling in Hendricks required that
the defendant be unable to control his behavior.73 The State of
Kansas sought clarification from the Supreme Court, arguing
that Hendricks did not "requir[e] the State always to prove that a
dangerous individual is completely unable to control his behav-
ior."74 Instead, Kansas claimed, the State only had to prove that
Crane had difficulty controlling his behavior."5
The Supreme Court agreed with the State and vacated the
judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court.76 The Court reasoned
that Hendricks specified not that a mental abnormality or per-
sonality disorder must make an offender unable to control his be-
66. Id. at 369 ("Our conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive thus removes an essential
prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.").
67. Id. at 361.
68. Id. at 361-62.
69. See id. at 371; Pearce, supra note 46, at 600.
70. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
71. 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).




76. Id. at 415.
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havior, but that the condition or disorder must make it difficult
for the person to check his predatory behavior.77 "Difficult" indi-
cates that lack of control is not absolute. "Insistence upon abso-
lute lack of control would risk barring the civil commitment of
highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormali-
ties."78 The Court reasoned that because there is no method by
which to demonstrate with any certainty whether an offender has
difficulty controlling his behavior, some "proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior" is "sufficient to distinguish the dangerous
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or dis-
order subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." 9
V. CURRENT STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES
Many states have statutes permitting post-incarceration civil
commitment of sexually violent predators that suffer from a men-
tal abnormality and have difficulty controlling their behavior.
Statutes vary from state to state, but most share several common,
critical features intended to strike a balance between society's in-
terest in civil commitment as a form of public protection and the
liberty interests of the offenders in confinement. Those features
are individualized treatment plans, less restrictive alternatives,
frequent reevaluation, and a right to petition for release." The
following is a brief discussion of SVP civil commitment statutes in
Washington and Texas.
A. Washington
Washington enacted the first modern civil commitment statute
for sexually violent predators.8 " The preamble indicates that the
statute allows for what "is intended to be a short-term civil com-
mitment system" for "a small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators .. .who do not have a mental disease
or defect that renders them appropriate for the existing involun-
77. Id. at 411.
78. Id. at 412.
79. Id. at 413.
80. Edward P. Ra, The Civil Confinement of Sexual Predators: A Delicate Balance, 22
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 335, 364-70 (2007).
81. Fabian, supra note 42, at 89.
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tary treatment act."8 2 Washington defines a "sexually violent
predator" as "any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality *or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not con-
fined in a secure facility."
8 3
The state procedure to civilly commit a sex offender begins
when "the prosecuting attorney of the county where the person
was convicted or charged or the attorney general . . . file[s] a peti-
tion alleging that the person is a 'sexually violent predator' and
stat[es] sufficient facts to support such allegation." 4 Once a peti-
tion has been filed, a judge determines whether there is probable
cause to believe the person named in the petition is a sexually
violent predator.85
After the probable cause determination, the court must hold a
trial 6 to determine if the person is, beyond a reasonable doubt,8 7
a sexually violent predator.8 8 At trial, the person has the right to
counsel, the right to retain experts or professionals, 9 and the
right to a trial by jury.9°
If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent
predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the de-
partment of social and health services... for control, care, and treat-
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002).
83. Id. § 71.09.020(16) (West Supp. 2008).
84. Id. § 71.09.030 (West 2002); see Pearce, supra note 46, at 583. The prosecuting at-
torney in the county where the person was charged or convicted or the attorney general
may file such a petition when it appears that: a person previously
convicted of a sexually violent offense is about to be released . . . ; a person
found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile is about to be
released . . . ; a person who has been charged with a sexually violent offense
and who has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial is about to be
released, or has been released... ; a person who has been found not guilty by
reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense is about to be released, or has
been released . . . ; [or when] a person who at any time previously has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total
confinement and has committed a recent overt act [ ] and it appears that the
person may be a sexually violent predator ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (West 2002).
85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040(1).
86. Id. § 71.09.050(1).
87. Id. § 71.09.060(1) (West Supp. 2008).
88. Id. § 71.09.050(1) (West 2002).
89. Id. § 71.09.050(2).
90. Id. § 71.09.050(3).
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ment until such time as: (a) The person's condition has so changed
that the person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent
predator; or (b) conditional release to a less restrictive alternative
... is in the best interest of the person and conditions can be im-
posed that would adequately protect the community.
9 1
Washington's statute includes safeguards for the liberty of
those committed under the statute. A person committed under
this statute will be reviewed annually to ensure that he or she
still meets the commitment criteria;92 a committed person has
"the right to adequate care and individualized treatment";93 the
professional in charge of the facility to which an individual is
committed must take precautions to maintain properly the com-
mitted person's personal property; 94 and persons committed re-
tain all rights presently available to them, among those the right
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.95 Further, in lieu of full
commitment, the court also may consider less restrictive alterna-
tives.9
6
Washington's is considered an exemplary SVP statute because
it incorporates (and specifies in the statute) individualized treat-
ment plans, less restrictive alternatives, frequent reevaluation,
and the right to petition for release. 97
B. Texas
The Texas SVP law mirrors Washington's statutory approach.
Both provide for the commitment and treatment of "a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators ... [who
have] a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to tradi-
tional mental illness treatment modalities and that makes the
predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of sexual
violence."98 Unique to Texas, however, is that the state provides
91. Id. § 71.09.060(1) (West Supp. 2008).
92. Id. § 71.09.70 (West 2002).
93. Id. § 71.09.080(2).
94. Id. § 71.09.080(3).
95. Id. § 71.09.080(4).
96. Id. § 71.09.092.
97. Ra, supra note 80, at 370-71.
98. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2003); see supra notes 81-
96 and accompanying text. Under Texas law, a "sexually violent predator" is one who "(1)
is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that
makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence." Id. § 841.003(a). A
'sexually violent predator" is also a person who:
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not for inpatient treatment of sexually violent predators, but for
outpatient commitment. 99 Further, Texas enforces criminal pen-
alties should an offender violate any requirements of his outpa-
tient commitment. 100
The process for civil commitment in Texas begins before a per-
son's anticipated release date, when the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice refers persons eligible for commitment to a mul-
tidisciplinary team. 1 1 Either the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice or the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation must then assess the person to determine if he or she
"suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence."" °2 If the as-
sessing team believes the person suffers from such a behavioral
abnormality, notice of the assessment is given to the attorney
representing the state. 103
Once the state's attorney receives such notice, the attorney
may file a petition stating facts sufficient to support an allegation
that the person is a sexually violent predator.0 4 No probable
cause hearing is held. After the filing of a petition, a judge con-
ducts a trial0 5 to determine whether, beyond a reasonable
doubt, 106 the person is a sexually violent predator.
is convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence is im-
posed for at least one of the offenses; or ... [one who] is convicted of a sexu-
ally violent offense, regardless of whether the sentence for the offense was
ever imposed or whether the sentence was probated; . . . [one who] enters a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a sexually violent offense in return for a
grant of deferred adjudication; [one who] is adjudged not guilty by reason of
insanity of a sexually violent offense; or [one who] is adjudicated by a juvenile
court of a sexually violent offense; ... [one who] is convicted, but only if the
sentence for the offense is imposed; or [one who] is adjudged not guilty by
reason of insanity.
Id. § 841.003(a)-(b).
99. Hall, supra note 22, at 186. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081
(Vernon Supp. 2007).
100. Id. § 841.085.
101. Id. § 841.021(a); see id. § 841.022(a) (listing required persons of multidisciplinary
review team).
102. Id. § 841.0 2 3(a).
103. Id. § 841.023(b).
104. Id. § 841.041(a). Texas restricts the filing of these petitions to a specific jurisdic-
tion. State's attorneys must file petitions in a Montgomery County district court, excluding
family district court. Id.
105. Id. § 841.061(a).
106. Id. § 841.062(a) (Vernon 2003).
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At trial, the person sought to be committed has the right to re-
quest a jury,1"7 to be examined by experts, 0 8 to appear at the
trial,"0 9 to present evidence," 0 to cross-examine a witness who
testifies against him,"' and to view and copy all petitions and re-
ports in the court file. 112
If either the judge or a jury concludes that an offender is a
sexually violent predator, the person is committed "for outpatient
treatment and supervision.""' The judge imposes on the person
to be committed specific requirements necessary to ensure com-
pliance with outpatient commitment as well as to safeguard the
community." 4 A committed person's violation of a requirement
107. Id. § 841.061(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
108. Id. § 841.061(c).
109. Id. § 841.061(d)(1).
110. Id. § 841.061(d)(2).
111. Id. § 841.061(d)(3).
112. Id. § 841.061(d)(4).
113. Id. § 841.081(a) (Vernon 2003).
114. Id. § 841.082(a).
The requirements shall include: (1) requiring the person to reside in a Texas
residential facility under contract with the council or at another location or
facility approved by the council; (2) prohibiting the person's contact with a
victim or potential victim of the person; (3) prohibiting the person's posses-
sion or use of alcohol, inhalants, or a controlled substance; (4) requiring the
person's participation in and compliance with a specific course of treatment;
(5) requiring the person to: (A) submit to tracking under a particular type of
tracking service and to any other appropriate supervision; and (B) refrain
from tampering with, altering, modifying, obstructing, or manipulating the
tracking equipment; (6) prohibiting the person from changing the person's
residence without prior authorization from the judge and from leaving the
state without that prior authorization; (7) if determined appropriate by the
judge, establishing a child safety zone in the same manner as a child safety
zone is established by a judge under Section 13B, Article 42.12, Code of
Criminal Procedure, and requiring the person to comply with requirements
related to the safety zone; (8) requiring the person to notify the case manager
immediately but in any event within 24 hours of any change in the person's
status that affects proper treatment and supervision, including a change in
the person's physical health or job status and including any incarceration of
the person; and (9) any other requirements determined necessary by the
judge. (b) A tracking service to which a person is required to submit under
Subsection (a)(5) must: (1) track the person's location in real time; (2) be able
to provide a real-time report of the person's location to the case manager at
the case manager's request; and (3) periodically provide a cumulative report
of the person's location to the case manager. (c) The judge shall provide a
copy of the requirements imposed under Subsection (a) to the person and to
the council. The council shall provide a copy of those requirements to the case
manager and to the service providers. (d) The court retains jurisdiction of the
case with respect to a civil commitment proceeding conducted under Sub-
chapters F and G. (e) The requirements imposed under Subsection (a) may be
modified at any time after notice to each affected party to the proceedings
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imposed by this statute results in a criminal penalty.'15 A person
committed under this statute is afforded many procedural safe-
guards, much as are committed persons in Washington." 6 A com-
mitted person receives biennial examination," 7 and may petition
for release from commitment at any time." 8 Further, because
Texas utilizes only outpatient treatment, it, by default, considers
less restrictive alternatives for persons committed under the
statute. 119
VI. THE VIRGINIA SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
A. Background
Virginia passed civil commitment legislation in 1999, but it
was not until 2003-when the Commonwealth was faced with the
pending release of Richard Ausley, a notorious pedophile-that
the legislature authorized money to finance the legislation.'20
On January 10, 1973, Richard "Peewee" Ausley lured thirteen-
year-old Martin Andrews into his van with the promise of pay-
ment if Andrews would help him move some furniture.' 2 ' Ausley
kidnapped Andrews, taking him deep into the woods in Suffolk,
where, for seven days, he held the boy captive in an underground
plywood hunting box. 122 Ausley repeatedly raped and beat An-
drews. 12 3 On the seventh day, Ausley chained Andrews in the box
and left him for dead. 124 On the morning of the eighth day, four
and a hearing.
Id. § 841.082(a)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 2007). This is a "contractual" restraint. Hall, supra
note 22, at 190.
115. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085(a).
116. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
117. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.101(a), 841.102(a) (Vernon 2003).
118. Id. §§ 841.122 (right to petition), 841.123 (petition procedures).
119. See id. § 841.121(a).
120. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
121. Warren Fiske, Martin Andrews: From Victim to Victor, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 25,







local hunters discovered Martin Andrews, eyes blacked, teeth
broken, and nose smashed. 12
5
Ausley was sentenced to forty-one years in prison for his brutal
attack on Andrews.' 26 In 2002, however, Andrews received a jar-
ring phone call: Richard Ausley was scheduled to be released
from prison the following April.'2 7 Ausley's impending release
spurred Andrews to action, and he began to lobby hard for Vir-
ginia to properly fund the civil commitment act it had passed in
1999.128 His efforts paid off-lawmakers appropriated $2.7 mil-
lion to start a thirty-six-bed civil commitment center in Peters-
burg. 129 It opened in 2003.130
B. The Virginia Statute
Virginia's Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA") defines a
"sexually violent predator" as "any person who (i) has been con-
victed of a sexually violent offense or has been charged with a
sexually violent offense.., and (ii) because of a mental abnormal-
ity or personality disorder, finds it difficult to control his preda-
tory behavior, which makes him likely to engage in sexually vio-
lent acts."13'
The SVPA provides that the Director of the Department of Cor-
rections maintain a database of all prisoners convicted of a sexu-
ally violent offense. 132 The Director consults the database each
month to identify all such prisoners who are within ten months of
release from prison.'33 Once the Director identifies those sexual
offenders nearing release, the Director must order an assessment
of the prisoner.'34
Virginia authorizes the use of the Static-99 actuarial test as







131. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2005).
132. Id. § 37.2-903(B).
133. Id. § 37.2-903(C).
134. Id. § 37.2-903(E) (Supp. 2007).
135. Id. § 37.2-903(C). Static-99 was developed by R. Karl Hanson, a senior research
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ble for commitment if they receive a score of five or more on the
Static-99, or a score of four on the Static-99 if the sexually violent
offense mandating the prisoner's evaluation was an aggravated
sexual battery where the victim was under the age of thirteen
and suffered physical bodily injury, 136 or if the offense was
rape,'37 forcible sodomy, 13 or object sexual penetration 139 where
the victim was under the age of thirteen. 4 ° Upon receipt of the
names of prisoners receiving a score of four or five on the Static-
99 test, the Director forwards the names to the Commitment Re-
view Committee ("CRC"). 141
The CRC, established by the Director of the Department of
Corrections, consists of seven members: three from the Depart-
ment of Corrections appointed by the Director; three from the
Department of Corrections appointed by the Commissioner of
Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Ser-
vices, at least one of whom is a Virginia-licensed psychologist or
psychiatrist "skilled in the diagnosis of mental abnormalities and
personality disorders associated with violent sex offenders"; and
one assistant or deputy attorney general. 142 Once the CRC re-
ceives prisoners' names from the Director, it must conduct as-
sessments of those prisoners for possible civil commitment and
forward its recommendation to the Attorney General.143 The CRC
recommends that the prisoner or defendant "(i) be committed as a
sexually violent predator. . ; (ii) not be committed, but be placed
in a conditional release program as a less restrictive alternative;
or (iii) not be committed because he does not meet the definition
of a sexually violent predator."
144
If the CRC recommends commitment, the Attorney General
has ninety days to file a petition for civil commitment in the cir-
cuit court where the inmate was last convicted of a sexual of-
officer for Canada's Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Fiske, Sex
Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3.
137. Id. § 18.2-61 (2004).
138. Id. § 18.2-67.1.
139. Id. § 18.2-67.2.
140. Id. § 37.2-903(C) (Supp. 2007).
141. Id. § 37.2-903(E).
142. Id. § 37.2-902 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 643 S.E.2d 208, 213-15
(Va. 2007) (discussing qualifications of a psychologist or psychiatrist).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-904(A) (2005).
144. Id. § 37.2-904(C).
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fense.145 Once a petition for civil commitment is filed, the circuit
court then holds a hearing to determine if there is probable cause
to find that the prisoner is a sexually violent predator. 146
If the judge finds probable cause to believe the prisoner is a
sexually violent predator, a trial is held. Despite statutory lan-
guage declaring that "all proceedings conducted hereunder are
civil proceedings,"' 14 a trial to determine whether a prisoner is a
sexually violent predator appears quasi-criminal in nature: the
prisoner has the right to an expert 14' and the right to a trial by
jury. 149 The standard of proof, however, is not "beyond a reason-
able doubt"; instead, the Attorney General must prove only "by
clear and convincing evidence" that the prisoner is a sexually vio-
lent offender.'50
Any person ordered committed under the SVPA is placed in the
custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation
and Substance Abuse Services for "control, care, and treatment
until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality
disorder has so changed that the person will not present an un-
due risk to public safety."'' Once a person is committed to the
Department, the Department must propose and monitor the of-
fender's compliance with a specific course of treatment. 152
Virginia provides committed persons the procedural safeguard
of a periodic review to determine the person's need for secure, in-
patient treatment. 15 Such a review is conducted annually for the
first five years and biennially thereafter.5 4 A committed person
may only petition for release in the years in which a review is not
required by statute.155
145. Id. § 37.2-905(A) (Supp. 2007).
146. Id. § 37.2-906(A).
147. Id. § 37.2-908(H).
148. Id. § 37.2-907(A).
149. Id. § 37.2-908(B).
150. Id. § 37.2-908(C).
151. Id. § 37.2-909(A).
152. Id. § 37.2-908(F).
153. Id. § 37.2-910(A).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 37.2-911(A).
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C. Legal Challenges to the Virginia SVPA: Shivaee v.
Commonwealth
Although many critics argue that civil commitment is a crimi-
nal proceeding "cloaked with civil procedural requirements,"156
and "just a way to keep people locked up indefinitely after they
have served out their prison sentences,"157 Virginia's SVPA has
survived constitutional challenge.
In June of 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the
constitutionality of civil commitment for sexually violent preda-
tors in Shivaee v. Commonwealth. 158 The court ruled that, in light
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Hendricks and Crane, Vir-
ginia's statute allowing for civil commitment of violent sex of-
fenders "comports with all constitutional requirements of due
process and is not unconstitutional."" 9
Two men confined under Virginia's SVPA, Rahmatollah
Shivaee and Orlando Lawarren Butler, challenged the law on
various grounds, including constitutional issues. 60 In 1996,
Shivaee was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery
and one count of indecent liberties, all against female victims un-
der the age of thirteen.161 In 1997, Shivaee was again convicted of
a sexual offense-this time, forcible sodomy of a boy less than
thirteen years old.162 In lieu of his release, which was scheduled
for September 17, 2003, the Attorney General petitioned for his
commitment. 163
Shivaee filed a motion to dismiss the petition for commitment
on the grounds that it violated both the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section II of the
Constitution of Virginia.'64 The court denied the motion, and tried
156. Mike Allen, Sex Crimes Carry Threat of Extended Detention, ROANOKE TIMES, May
13, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 9141042.
157. Holly A. Heyser, Virginia Sex Offenders: Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key?
The General Assembly Is Poised to Pass a Law to Let the State Incarcerate Violent Sex Of-
fenders for the Crimes They Might Commit, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 16, 1999, at Al, avail-
able at 1999 WLNR 2274862.
158. 613 S.E.2d 570 (Va. 2005).
159. Id. at 576, 579.
160. See id. at 579.






Shivaee to determine whether he met the criteria for a sexually
violent predator.165
At trial, Shivaee's social worker testified that Shivaee did not
complete the Sex Offender Residential Treatment ("SORT") Pro-
gram while incarcerated, he admitted only to some inappropriate
touching, and he denied most of his illegal interactions with chil-
dren.166 Testimony from both the Commonwealth's expert and
Shivaee's expert revealed that Shivaee suffered from pedo-
philia.'67 The experts differed only in their recommendations for
treatment-the Commonwealth's expert recommended inpatient
treatment, and Shivaee's expert recommended outpatient treat-
ment.168 Based on this evidence, the trial court found Shivaee to
be a sexually violent predator and ordered his civil commit-
ment. 1
69
Like Shivaee, Orlando Butler also was convicted of aggravated
sexual battery.'70 He was sentenced to ten years of incarceration
with seven years suspended. 7' As his release date approached,
the Attorney General petitioned for civil commitment. 7 2 After a
finding of probable cause that Butler was a sexually violent
predator, the court set a trial date.'73 Like Shivaee, Butler filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Virginia SVPA violated
both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, Section II of the Constitution of Virginia.
74
The trial court denied the motion, and Butler was determined to
be a sexually violent predator in need of civil commitment.'75 The
Supreme Court of Virginia combined Shivaee's and Butler's ap-
peals to consider the constitutionality of the statute confining










173. Id. at 574.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 570, 572.
2008] 1321
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court found that "[t]he SVPA survives constitutional scru-
tiny because it satisfies the criteria most recently stated by the
Supreme Court [of the United States] in Crane."177 The Virginia
SVPA meets the Crane criteria because "there are proper proce-
dures and evidentiary safeguards" in place; the statute requires
"a finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others"; and
"proof of dangerousness and lack of control is linked to the condi-
tion of the person."178
The court rejected Shivaee and Butler's claim that the statute
is unconstitutional because it requires only "proof that a person
'finds it difficult' to control his behavior and fails to require 'seri-
ous difficulty,' a term used in Crane."79 The court found that the
Supreme Court's decision in Crane left leeway for the states to de-
fine the mental abnormalities that make a person eligible for
commitment because "'inability to control behavior' will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision.""80 The purpose of the
"proof requirements is 'to distinguish the dangerous sexual of-
fender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder sub-
jects him to civil commitment from the ... typical recidivist con-
victed in an ordinary criminal case."''" The court found that
Virginia's statute met this objective."8 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia also rejected arguments that
the SVPA violated constitutional protections against double jeop-
ardy or ex post facto laws. 13 The court unequivocally declared the
statute civil, relying primarily on its placement within the civil
code, and the fact that it implicates neither retribution nor deter-
rence, the twin aims of a criminal statute.1i 4 Thus, the court
stated, "[Tihe SVPA is a non-punitive, civil commitment statute
and as such does not violate the guarantees against double jeop-
ardy or ex post facto lawmaking."8 5
Further, the court found that the adoption of a standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" is appropriate in a civil proceed-
177. Id. at 576; see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-14 (2002).
178. Shivaee, 613 S.E.2d at 576.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 577 (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413).
181. Id. (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 577-78.
185. Id. at 578.
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ing. "6 States may adopt the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard in an effort to afford individuals greater protection against
the "possibility of an erroneous deprivation of liberty,"18 7 but the
Virginia General Assembly's adoption of the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard comports with due process. 8
VII. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE VIRGINIA SVPA
A. What Virginia Does Well
The Virginia SVPA, modeled after a parallel Wisconsin stat-
ute, 89 strives to achieve an appropriate balance between the
rights of the committed person and the right of the Common-
wealth to protect its citizens. 190
Virginia affords sexually violent predators a number of proce-
dural protections. A sex offender on trial to determine whether he
is a sexually violent predator, and therefore eligible for confine-
ment, is afforded many of the trappings of a criminal trial: repre-
sentation by counsel, adequate notice of the proceedings, the right
to remain silent or to testify, the right to be present during a
hearing or trial, the right to present evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses, the right to view and copy all petitions and
reports in the court file, the right to assistance by experts, and
the right to a trial by jury. 191
Virginia also provides committed offenders intensive treat-
ment. The Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation
('VCBR") staff "operates within a psychosocial rehabilitation
186. Id.
187. John P. Zanini, Considering Hendricks v. Kansas for Massachusetts: Can the
Commonwealth Constitutionally Detain Dangerous Persons Who Are Not Mentally Ill?, 23
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 453 (1997) (discussing Massachusetts'
sexual offender civil commitment statute).
188. Shivaee, 613 S.E.2d at 578.
189. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, Public Relations, Va. Ctr. for Behavioral
Rehabilitation, in Petersburg, Va. (Jan. 8, 2008); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01-980.14
(West 2007).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901, -907(A), -908(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007); see also VA. STATE
CRIME COMM'N, supra note 18, at 61-62; Angela Axselle & Jill Ryan, Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators in Virginia, THE JOURNAL (Va. Probation & Parole Ass'n), Mar.
2007, http://www.govppa.org/newsletter/07-march/index-files/Page538.htm.
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model that emphasizes that every interaction between staff and
residents is potentially therapeutic." '192 Residents work with
therapists to plan their treatment-bringing offenders into the
planning process is designed to reduce risk so that residents may
be conditionally released to, and function safely within, the com-
munity.
193
B. Room for Improvement
Despite these procedural protections, the promise of intensive
treatment, and constitutional clearance, the Virginia SVPA is not
free from criticism. The SVPA blurs the lines between civil and
criminal law and decimates the state legislature's budget.
1. The Lines Between Civil and Criminal Are Blurred
Virginia prisons are run by the Department of Corrections,
whereas the facility housing Virginia's sexually violent predators
is operated by the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retar-
dation and Substance Abuse Services.194 "The distinctions [be-
tween the two] often seem blurry."195
Although persons committed to the VCBR are officially called
"residents" rather than inmates,'96 these individuals are permit-
ted little more than basic comforts and necessities upon their ar-
rival at the center: indeed, it is more like a prison setting. '9 The
facility's chief psychologist, Mario Dennis, claims that offenders
have a much better lifestyle in civil commitment than in prison:
"When not in therapy, residents are allowed to roam the yards
and common areas. They are not required to wear uniforms, and
they have a library with books and appropriate videos." 9 ' Resi-
dents, however, do not begin with such privileges. They must pro-
192. Mario J.P. Dennis, The Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation, THE
JOURNAL (Va. Probation & Parole Ass'n), Mar. 2007, http://www.govppa.org/newsletter/07
_march/indexfiles/Page538.htm.
193. Id.
194. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
195. Id. "There is a blurring ... of the distinctions between traditional civil commit-
ment and criminal sentencing because a sexually dangerous person has been convicted of
a crime after a traditional criminal trial, and thus has been held fully responsible as an
individual for his or her acts and choices." Zanini, supra note 187, at 452.
196. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
197. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, supra note 189.
198. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
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gress in their therapy in order to earn privileges, such as televi-
sion and the ability to shop in the center's commissary.' 99
Critics argue that if "residents" are locked in a prison-like facil-
ity without the ability to come and go and without proper treat-
ment, civil commitment is not a civil remedy; "it is nothing more
than a jail with a fancy name. "20 Indeed, some defense attorneys
claim to treat civil commitment cases like death penalty cases be-
cause clients assume that once they are committed as sexually
violent predators, they will never be released. 20 ' The clients are
correct-with few releases nationwide, commitment amounts to a
life sentence after offenders have served their full prison sen-
tences.2°2
That the Virginia SVPA is modeled after Wisconsin's sexually
violent predator laws 2 3 further evidences a blurring of civil and
criminal law. Wisconsin's statutes allowing for civil confinement
of sexually violent predators are located in the criminal code.20 4
New SVP laws typically contain a preamble of legislative findings
acknowledging the law's purpose and, in some cases, highlighting
some "conceptual weaknesses."2 5 Clarification of a legislature's
intent-is this a civil law, or criminal?-is often found in the
law's preamble. The Virginia SVPA, however, like its Wisconsin
model, lacks a preamble or statement of legislative findings eluci-
dating the intent of the law. 206
Perhaps an absence of legislative findings or preamble reflects
uncertainty in the goals of passing this type of statute. Even
those who operate facilities housing sexually violent predators
have expressed confusion about the proper role of such facilities-
199. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, supra note 189.
200. Laurence Hammack, Committed to Treatment, ROANOKE TIMES, June 5, 2005, at
Al, available at 2005 WLNR 9022697. Some residents claim the only therapy received is a
daily ninety-minute group session. Id.
201. Frank Green, Offender Program Has Many Critics; Will Its Use in Va. Cause a
New Furor?, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WLNR
2113801 [hereinafter Green, New Furor].
202. Id. "'It is a maximum-security prison disguised as a so-called treatment center.'"
Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3 (quoting a letter written to the newspaper
by James Jenkins, a resident of the center).
203. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, supra note 189.
204. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-.14 (West 2007).
205. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 77.
206. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (Cum. Supp. 2007) with WIS. STAT. ANN. §
980.01 (West 2007).
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'Is it a prison? Is it a mental health center?"'2 °7 Should Richard
Ausley be kept locked up because he is a "bad" guy, a criminal
who will attack again? Or is Richard Ausley "mad"-an offender
who suffers a mental abnormality and cannot control his behav-
ior? A statement of the purpose of the law would have clarified
the legislature's intent.208
2. Ballooning Costs
In addition to blurring the line between civil and criminal, the
Virginia SVPA is a constant drain on the Commonwealth's pock-
ets. "The cost of [civil commitment] programs is virtually un-
checked and growing.... "209 The VCBR does not keep a running
tally of the cost per year to Virginia taxpayers to confine each sex
offender. 21 Estimates, however, indicate that it costs $140,000
per resident per year to confine sexual offenders to the current
Petersburg facility-six times the average cost per inmate per
year in a Virginia prison.211 "Commitments are starting to add
up," and with "next-to-no releases anywhere, including in states
with mature systems, one can expect dramatic growth" in the to-
tal number of committed sex offenders in the years to come.212 In
fact, the new Nottoway County facility may be filled in as few as
three years. 2
13
Such ballooning costs of Virginia's civil commitment program
are a problem of the legislature's own making. The implementa-
tion of a new, comprehensive screening test for those eligible for
civil commitment, the Static-99, 2 4 "will vastly increase the num-
207. Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, A Record of Failure at a Center for Sex Offend-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/
us/05civil.html.
208. See, e.g., 2007-1 N.Y. Consol. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv. 139 (Lexis Nexis) (to be codi-
fied at N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a)-(g)) (preamble expressly clarifies legislature's
intent).
209. Davey & Goodnough, Doubts Rise, supra note 55.
210. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, supra note 189.
211. A Profile of Civil Commitment Around the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/03/03/us/20070304 CIVILGRAPHIC.html. The
average cost per inmate per year in prison is $23,123. Id.; see also Fiske, Sex Offenders
and the Law, supra note 3.
212. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 81-82.
213. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
214. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-903(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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ber of sex offenders referred for civil commitment."215 The Static-
99 is considered a better assessment tool than the Rapid Risk As-
sessment for Sexual Offender Recidivism, the test previously used
by Virginia prisons to identify offenders eligible for commit-
ment.216 The Static-99 scoring method, however, likely renders
many more offenders eligible for commitment, and by choosing
this screening test, the legislature handicapped itself: it was
forced to borrow $62 million to build the 300-bed Nottoway
County facility because a smaller, $33 million, 100-bed treatment
center, would not be large enough to house all the offenders eligi-
ble for commitment under the Static-99 test.217
Moreover, that $140,000 per-resident, per-year figure repre-
sents an institution running at full capacity. Virginia currently
has about sixty committed sexually violent predators.218 The re-
cently opened Nottoway County facility, which will house up to
300 offenders and employ a staff of 350 when all phases of con-
struction are complete,21 9 is not running at capacity. "[T]he num-
ber of offenders committed to the program has been lower than
initially thought":220 the program simply has not grown as quickly
as the legislature expected.22' In fact, last year's projection for the
total number of committed sexually violent predators was 113.222
As there are only about sixty men currently in the facility, the
Center evidently fell far short of that projection. At best, the Cen-
ter projects to have 113 committed offenders by the summer of
2008.223 In all actuality, therefore, Virginia will continue to lose
money on this facility until it eventually operates at capacity.
215. Candace Rondeaux, Va. Faces Ballooning Cost to Confine Sex Offenders, WASH.
POST, Apr. 2, 2006, at C1.
216. Frank Green, Where is This Man? Should This Child Molester and Cop Killer
Have Been Released?, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 2006, at Al, available at 2006
WLNR 6547343.
217. Rondeaux, supra note 215.
218. Green, Center for Sex Offenders Opens, supra note 1.
219. Id.
220. Frank Green, Funds Sought for Sex-Convict Center; Unit Also Needs New Home;
Residents of Dinwiddie Want It Out, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 2005, at Al, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 402542 [hereinafter Green, Funds Sought].
221. Id.
222. Telephone interview with Adam Austin, supra note 189.
223. See Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Virginia SVPA is a simple solution to the fearsome public
policy problem of sexual predation: lock them up and throw away
the key. "Better safe than sorry will be the understandable
motto ' 224 as the state continues to civilly commit offenders. But
the costs of a "better safe than sorry" approach can quickly "spiral
out of control," which has been the experience of other states with
civil commitment laws;2 25 therefore, Virginia must be wary of this
potential pitfall and should consider changes to the law to avoid
such a problem.
A. Reform the Law
Perhaps the most clear-cut solution to the problem of ever-
increasing costs of civil commitment is to eliminate civil commit-
ment statutes entirely and enhance criminal sanctions and
treatment within the current criminal system. 226 Because civil
commitment statutes are expensive, challenge the mental health
system, and have not proven to accurately predict recidivism or
successfully treat sex offenders,227 their elimination would be a
cost-effective solution.
No state that has adopted a sex offender civil commitment
statute, however, has ended the program. 22 ' Ending the program
would be politically impractical-a public policy "black hole."229
Moreover, ending civil commitment is unlikely in Virginia, where
proponents of the law feel strongly that sex offenders are the
"'worst of the worst,' '' 230 and "[t]he money spent on civil commit-
ment is worth it when you consider the alternative . . . [:1 'the
number of victims that these individuals would have if you put
224. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 92.
225. Rondeaux, supra note 215.
226. See Jeremiah W. White, Note, Is Iowa's Sexual Predator Statute "Civil"? The Civil
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators After Kansas v. Crane, 89 IOWA L. REV. 739,
768-69 (2004) (offering a proposal for the Iowa legislature to "make civil commitments and
criminal punishments for the same sexual offenses mutually exclusive").
227. See id. at 773.
228. Green, Funds Sought, supra note 220.
229. Id. (quoting John Q. LaFond, a professor at University of Missouri-Kansas City
School of Law and an expert on the civil commitment of violent sex offenders).




them back on the street .... "m231 Therefore, because ending civil
commitment is not a politically viable option, Virginia should re-
form the current law.
1. Make Civil Commitments and Criminal Punishments for the
Same Sexual Offenses Mutually Exclusive
Virginia law provides that a "sexually violent predator" has a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that causes him
difficulty controlling his predatory behavior, which then leads to
the commission of sexually violent acts. 232 A "mental abnormal-
ity" or "personality disorder" is defined as a "condition that affects
a person's emotional or volitional capacity and renders the person
so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a
menace to the health and safety of others."233 Experts say that
violent sexual predation, however, is not itself a mental disorder;
it is criminal conduct.2 34 Therefore, Virginia must distinguish
clearly between sexual offenders who truly have difficulty control-
ling their behavior-those offenders who lack the free will to con-
trol themselves-and those who have some control and are thus
fit for criminal punishment. The Virginia legislature must make
civil commitments and criminal punishments for the same sexual
offenses mutually exclusive.235 In other words, "society must de-
cide whether sexually violent predators are mad or bad."236
Revised legislation should require a prosecutor, prior to for-
mally charging a sexually violent offense, to request an initial
hearing to civilly commit the individual for the recent criminal
act.237 Should the prosecutor fail to request this initial hearing for
civil commitment prior to indictment on a criminal charge, the
231. Hammack, supra note 200 (quoting Virginia House of Delegates Majority Leader
Morgan Griffith, R-Salem).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
233. Id.
234. Oliver, supra note 56 (discussing the Washington State Psychiatric Association's
amicus brief arguing that Washington's civil commitment statute must be overturned).
235. See White, supra note 226, at 768-69 (offering a proposal for the Iowa legislature
to "make civil commitments and criminal punishment for the same sexual offenses mutu-
ally exclusive").
236. Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 250, 259 (1998).
237. See White, supra note 226, at 769.
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State waives the possibility of commitment, and civil commitment
for that particular crime is now impossible.238
Once the initial hearing is requested, the process should con-
tinue with review by a multidisciplinary team to determine if the
person is a "sexual civilly committable person." 239 "Sexual civilly
committable persons" differ from sexual predators. They are
individuals, who are necessarily appropriate for civil commitment, in
lieu of facing a criminal charge with a sexually violent offense, after
being determined by a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to
have a mental illness, disease, defect, or abnormality that produces a
substantial and serious inability to control sexual impulses and be-
havior, thereby rendering criminal sentencing and punishment in-
appropriate and unnecessary.240
The multidisciplinary team may recommend the person for trial
to determine whether the person is a "sexual civilly committable
person."241
If a civil jury determines that the person is a "sexual civilly
committable person," the person should be remanded to the cus-
tody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation
and Substance Abuse Services for "care, control, and treat-
ment."2 42 This is a fitting sentence for someone who, as the victim
of a mental condition, is not criminally responsible. Criminal pun-
ishment via incarceration for a "mad" person is inappropriate.
2 43
Alternatively, sexually violent predators who are found not to
have difficulty controlling their behavior-those who are "bad"-
may be convicted.2"4 These persons may be charged with a sexu-
ally violent crime under certain circumstances: if the prosecuting
attorney fails to request a hearing for a sexual civil commitment
prior to a formal charge, if the team reviewing the offender de-
clines to recommend a commitment, or if the civil jury "finds the
person is not a sexual civilly committable person."2 45 This aligns




241. Id. at 769-70.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 770-71.
244. See id. at 771.
245. Id. at 772.
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ual predator has the free will to control his behavior, and hence,
deserves punishment, which may deter future recidivism. 246
2. Invoke the Criminal Law
Some critics argue that sexual predator commitment laws are
really no more than "an emotional reaction to the too-lenient sen-
tences levied on sexual criminals."247 If, indeed, civil commitment
laws are designed in response to these "emotional reactions," then
mandatory terms of criminal incarceration-aligned with the
criminal system's objectives of retribution and deterrence24 '-
would adequately address public concerns. In criminal sentenc-
ing, "the aphorism that past behavior is the best predictor of fu-
ture behavior has long been accepted by the legislature and the
courts."249 Therefore, longer criminal sentences for sexual of-
fenses would ensure that offenders serve their time, and is an apt
response to the perceived threat to public safety posed by sex of-
fenders. 25' For example, a life sentence upon conviction of a third
sexually violent offense properly utilizes the criminal law to com-
ply with the Commonwealth's desire to preserve a strict legisla-
tive stance against sexually violent predators.251
Virginia has recently made steps in this direction. In 2006, the
General Assembly mandated longer minimum sentences for of-
fenders convicted of sex crimes against children under the age of
thirteen. 2 2 Twice-convicted pedophiles now face mandatory life
sentences.253 In conjunction with former Governor George Allen's
"Truth-in-Sentencing" initiative,254 the Commonwealth is making
a strong effort to better use the criminal law. Virginia, however,
should continue to increase punishment for sex offenders in order
to satisfy public demand for retribution and deterrence.
246. Id.
247. Oliver, supra note 56.
248. See White, supra note 226, at 772.
249. Zanini, supra note 187, at 455.
250. Morse, supra note 236, at 264.
251. See White, supra note 226, at 773.
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-903(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
253. Id.
254. "Truth-in-Sentencing" increases prison terms for violent and repeat offenders and
ensures that inmates serve, at a minimum, 85% of the sentence imposed. BRIAN J. OSTROM
ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN VIRGINIA 4 (1999), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187677.pdf.
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B. Invest Resources in Treatment; Consider More Alternative
Treatments
Without such changes to the existing law, Virginia's civil com-
mitment program will continue to grow rapidly. Some legislators
say that even the new facility in Nottoway County may be filled
in as few as three years. 255 New facilities, larger staffs, larger
budget allocations-essentially, throwing money at the problem-
will not resolve the issue; instead, it will only create a "fiscal
black hole."256 Virginia should invest resources on the front end
and consider more alternative treatments to control spending and
reduce the overall number of sex offenders committed to the De-
partment of Mental Health.
1. Invest in Treatment
To date, no offenders have been discharged from Virginia's civil
commitment program.257 In fact, the VCBR's chief psychologist
has never even recommended a "resident" for release.255 Often,
people have no hope that hard-core sex offenders can be rehabili-
tated; they believe that "'once you check into this facility, you
won't be checking out-at least not in a vertical position."'
259
Such statements belie the Commonwealth's attitude that sex
offenders are treatable and call into question Virginia's commit-
ment to meaningful treatment in the VCBR facility. If sex offend-
ers are
'as sick as the attorney general contends, then we as a society have
an obligation to spend money on the front end on treatment and de-
tection of potential re-offenders, rather than spending money on the
back end after their sentences and warehousing them until they die
of old age.'
260
255. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
256. See Green, New Furor, supra note 201.
257. Fiske, Sex Offenders and the Law, supra note 3.
258. Id.
259. Hammack, supra note 200 (quoting William Petty, Commonwealth's Attorney,
Lynchburg, Va.); see also Kathryn Orth, Ground Broken for Center to Confine Sex Offend-
ers, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 21, 2006, at B8 ("Sexually violent predators are 'lost
souls.'").
260. Rondeaux, supra note 215 (quoting Leigh Drewry, attorney for Lorenzo Townes,
who was civilly committed under Virginia law). See generally Townes v. Commonwealth,
609 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 2005).
[Vol. 42:13011332
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
Virginia's $62 million investment in a new facility to house its
sexual predators is, therefore, misguided spending: the Com-
monwealth should reinvest its resources in identifying offenders
with an illness and treating them before they reoffend. The
Commonwealth should devote more research and funding to de-
veloping a risk assessment tool to predict accurately recidivism,
to the studying effects of drug-related therapy, and to analyzing
the efficacy of different therapeutic models.
2. Develop a Risk Assessment Tool to Accurately Predict
Recidivism
Risk of recidivism varies amongst sex offenders. 2 1 Estimating
recidivism rates can be difficult because many sexual offenses go
unreported, 262 but the Static-99 test shows moderate predictive
accuracy for sexual recidivism and violent recidivism. 263 This test
has its shortcomings, however. It is meant to estimate long-term
recidivism, and because it only takes into account static factors,
such as prior offenses and age of the offender at the time of the
offense, it cannot be used to select offenders who will benefit from
treatment, to measure change, or to identify whether sex offend-
ers will reoffend.264
Further, Static-99, as with most other sex offender assessment
tools, was developed for and normed on adult male sex offend-
ers. 265 Risk assessment tools for female offenders have not yet
been developed.26 6 Although some risk factors are as relevant for
females as they are for males, assessment measures are not
framed around female offenders and may not adequately capture
how risk factors interact.267 The Commonwealth must further re-
261. Jennifer M. Connor, Seling v. Young: Constitutionally Protected but Unjust Civil
Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 511, 531
(2002).
262. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, supra note 18, at 8.
263. R. KARL HANSON & DAVID THORNTON, STATIC 99: IMPROVING ACTUARIAL RISK
ASSESSMENTS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 17 (1999), available at http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publica
tions/corrections/199902_e.pdf. The development of and nuances between actuarial tools
merit further discussion, but are beyond the scope of this comment.
264. Id. at 18, app. I.
265. See id. at app. I; CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., FEMALE SEX OFFENDERS 8
(2007), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/female sex-offendersbrief.pdf.
266. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., supra note 265, at 9.
267. Id.
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search and develop risk assessment tools to adequately address
all offenders.
3. Efficacy of Therapeutic Models
Therapists can take many different approaches to the treat-
ment of sex offenders.268 Aversion therapy, orgasmic recondition-
ing, cognitive restructuring, social skills training, and phallomet-
ric studies are among the methods used to evaluate and treat sex
offenders.269 Some offenders are treated using "relapse preven-
tion," which has similarities to Alcoholics Anonymous pro-
grams. 2' ° This particular approach requires offenders to admit
their misconduct and unlawful activities, and to approach treat-
ment as a daily "struggle with temptation. ' 271 "Yet there is no
convincing evidence that the approach works, or that others do
either."
27 2
Virginia must invest in further research to examine the effi-
cacy of certain therapeutic models and consider that some offend-
ers-or perhaps certain types of offenders-respond more favora-
bly to different therapeutic techniques. Because effective
treatment often is elusive, "'[rlegardless of the structure of the
treatment program, the duration of the treatment program, the
nature of the treatment program . . . what we basically have is
living experiments."273 Investment in research to determine the
types of offenders who respond best to certain therapeutic models
will transform these living experiments into true treatment pro-
grams.
4. Consider Less Restrictive Alternatives
Virginia should also consider less restrictive alternatives for
more offenders, namely, outpatient treatment rather than civil
commitment. The Texas SVP statute, which authorizes a program
based entirely on outpatient treatment, is an example of adequate
268. See Connor, supra note 261, at 533.
269. Id.
270. Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, For Sex Offenders, a Dispute over Therapy's







less-restrictive alternatives for sexual offenders. 274 Texas's outpa-
tient program, instituted primarily for fiscal reasons, is consid-
ered successful because it has saved the state money.275
Virginia also may find success-fiscal, at least-by transition-
ing from inpatient to outpatient therapy for certain sex offenders.
Certainly outpatient treatment would require a number of differ-
ent support services and monitoring procedures for each offender.
By releasing some offenders back into the community with ap-
propriate supervision and services, though, Virginia can then
properly spend funds to identify and treat sex offenders before
they reoffend, providing "security and treatment for 10 times as
many low-risk offenders as offenders that are civilly commit-
ted.,276
IX. CONCLUSION
The Virginia SVPA comes within the parameters established
by the Supreme Court of the United States. It strives to provide
safeguards to protect the liberty interests of persons convicted
under the statute. The new facility housing the VCBR, however,
is not money well-spent. As the costs of civil commitment
threaten both the state budget and offenders' constitutional
rights,277 the Virginia legislature should consider reforming the
current law to make better use of its limited resources. The Vir-
ginia legislature should clarify the intent of the law and consider
revising the SVPA to make civil commitment and criminal pun-
ishment for the same sexual offense mutually exclusive. The leg-
274. See supra Part V.B.
275. Hall, supra note 22, at 189.
276. Rondeaux, supra note 215. In addition to some fiscal success, Virginia may find
some success in treating sex offenders and preventing them from reoffending by offering
individualized outpatient services. Cf. KARL W. DENNIS & IRA S. LOURIE, EVERYTHING IS
NORMAL UNTIL PROVEN OTHERWISE (2006) (arguing for the reform of the foster care sys-
tem by utilizing "wraparound services," or putting various child- and family-specific pro-
grams in place in the home rather than removing children to residential institutions to
treat behavioral and emotional problems). There is nothing "magical about putting young
people who have the same issues together in the same program .... Even worse, we put
all the sex offenders together, and we know what they have learned from each other!" Id.
at 8. Home is a better environment for providing services to children than a residential
institution. Id. at 2. After removing children from residential institutions, the authors saw
great success with some very difficult cases by creating highly individualized treatment
programs within families and communities. See id. at 9.
277. Hammack, supra note 200.
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islature should also consider transitioning more offenders to out-
patient, less-restrictive therapeutic alternatives.
Finally, the Commonwealth must invest its resources on the
front end to identify and treat offenders with a problem before
they recidivate. Investing in treatment and in proper tools to
identify sexually violent predators, and researching differing
methods of therapy will allow Virginia to treat the problem before
these offenders are permanently warehoused in the Virginia Cen-
ter for Behavioral Rehabilitation.
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